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INHIBITING RELIANCE ON BIOLOGICAL
WEAPONRY: THE ROLE AND RELEVANCE OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW
Richard A. Falk*
Strengthening international law restraints on recourse to biological
warfare is certainly useful, but an exclusive focus on the importance of
international law can be misleading. Unfortunately, experience in war-
time suggests that nations determine their weapons options primarily
from considerations of military advantage. The government, as the
nexus for military policy-making, is a power system with relatively lit-
tle independent disposition to constrain battlefield behavior out of re-
spect for moral and legal norms, however firmly established by treaty
and custom. This attitude, often associated with a realpolitik orienta-
tion, is especially pronounced in foreign affairs during periods of armed
conflict. In a nuclear age of intense conflict among strategic rivals, war
planning is a permanent feature of governmental operations, making
the search for potential military advantage a perpetual one, and the
fear of military vulnerability a constant preoccupation. Perception and
misperception of the other side's activities tends to be crucial; it has
become a matter of self-interest not to accuse prematurely or to react
in a paranoid fashion to ambiguous information concerning possible vi-
olations of arms control agreements. This type of discipline and self-
restraint is particularly important in regard to the subject of biological
weaponry. In such an atmosphere, statesmen tend to invoke ultimate
concerns about "sovereignty" and "survival" whenever they feel the
need to justify official behavior. Normative thinkers have reinforced
this behavior by drawing a distinction in international affairs between
"moral man" and "immoral society," by speaking of the misfit between
"a Lockean nation" and "a Hobbesian world," and by conceiving of
international conflict as a struggle between our "good" and their "evil."
In any event, whether or not "realism" is still "practical," given the
character of modern warfare and weaponry, a geopolitical ethos per-
vades official circles that is skeptical about the propriety of restraining
foreign policy, especially on the battlefield, out of respect for interna-
tional law. The admiration accorded Henry Kissinger as a diplomat par
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excellence was a tribute, in part, to his embodiment of statist "real-
ism," including his undisguisedly scornful attitude toward normative
restraints.
Certain additional factors reinforce this skepticism about legal re-
straints. Legal rules are almost impossible to draft without allowing the
parties some degree of latititude in interpreting their scope. Often, un-
resolved disputes that arise during treaty negotiations produce "deliber-
ate" ambiguities in the language of a final agreement. Because compli-
ance is, in the first instance at least, solely dependent upon self-
interpretation by governments, there is plenty of room for independent
maneuvering within the four corners of virtually every international
agreement. Particularly in the area of wartime restrictions, states are
notoriously reluctant to accept third-party procedures for resolving dis-
putes concerning alleged treaty violations.'
Further, allegations of violations of international restraints often are
difficult to substantiate, thus blurring the distinction between genuine
treaty violations and hostile propaganda. The "yellow rain" controversy
is a recent illustration of this dilemma.2 Parties eager to justify an ad-
1. For example, in 1952 the United States invited the International Committee of
the Red Cross (ICRC) to investigate charges that the United States had used chemical
weapons in Korea. Korea and China, however, would not cooperate, so no formal in-
quiry could be made. 10 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 461, 462
(1968). Subsequently, the Soviet Union blocked by veto a U.N. Security Council Draft
Resolution requesting the ICRC to investigate the charges and report to the Security
Council. Id. at 465. In 1953, the General Assembly adopted a resolution proposing that
a multistate commission investigate and report to the General Assembly. Id. The inves-
tigation was contingent on acceptance by all the governments involved; again, the
North Korean and Chinese governments refused to cooperate. Id. at 456-66.
More recent examples of governmental reluctance to concede the resolution of inter-
state disputes to international bodies include the withdrawal of the United States from
the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice in the midst of its
displeasure with the Court's decision in the Nicaragua case, Military and Paramilitary
Activities in and against Nicaragua, (Nicar. v. U.S.) 1984 I.C.J. 392 (Judgment of
Nov. 26).
2. Yellow rain refers to villagers' descriptions of a yellow fog and yellow particles
falling from the sky shortly before they began to experience physical symptoms of ill-
ness. Letters and notes verbales from the United States, Democratic Kampuchea, Viet-
nam, and the U.S.S.R. sent to the United Nations in 1980 and 1981 charged that these
reports indicated that chemical/biological agents were being used in Southeast Asia.
Letters and notes verbales from Democratic Kampuchea, U.N. Docs. A/36/81, A/36/
04, A/36/121, A/36/157, A/36/173, A/36/207, A/36/229, A/36/232-S/14473, A/
36/254, A/36/312, A/36/664, A/36/687, A/36/721-S/14770, A/36/769; U.S.S.R.,
U.N. Doc. A/C.1/36/16; United States, U.N. Docs. A/36/509 (note verbales), A/
C.1/36/10 (note verbales); Vietnam, U.N. Doc. A/36/549, A/C.1/36/5.
By resolution, the General Assembly requested that the Secretary-General appoint a
group of medical and technical experts to investigate these allegations. G.A. Res.
144C, 35 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 48) at 61, U.N. Doc. A/35/687 (1980). Despite an
extensive investigation of the charges, the final report of the U.N. Group of Experts
was inconclusive. Chemical and Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons: Report of the
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versarial approach to East-West relations vigorously endorsed the alle-
gations, whereas reassurances and skepticism as to the charges tended
to flow from viewpoints favoring strategic moderation. Although politi-
cal moderates seemed far more inclined to rest their case upon evi-
dence3 and an overall assessment of the situation, the merits were
rarely seriously or objectively addressed by either superpower.
A related difficulty in maintaining respect for normative restraints is
that of tu quoque, the basic notion that whatever the other side does,
or might conceivably do, can, with propriety, be offset by comparable
capabilities and contingency plans.4 Suspicions that the Soviet Union
has embarked upon a biological weapons program" encourage those
who favor research and development activities by the United States for
both deterrent and retaliatory effects, as well as for possible defensive
measures, such as protective clothing or immunization. This setting
heightens governmental secrecy. Accordingly, civil servants invoke "na-
tional security" to justify ignoring normative restraints," even those ex-
plicitly written into international law.
These orienting comments are not meant to denigrate the existing
treaty regime restraining resort to biological weaponry, which enjoys
widespread support and is a major arms control achievement. Rather,
the purpose of this article is to locate inquiry and appraisal in an inter-
mediate zone between legalism (regarding the law as determinative of
official behavior) and cynicism (assuming unscrupulous and unre-
strained displays of force as inevitable in international relations).1 An
additional concern touches upon a critical component of arms control:
the societal procedures and relations in the formulation and enforce-
Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. A/37/259 at 49 (1982). See also M. STORELLA,
POISONING ARMS CONTROL: THE SOVIET UNION AND CHEMICAL/BIOLOGICAL WEAP-
ONS 36-37 (1984) (noting that the U.N. Group of Experts was unable to verify the
evidence of the use of chemical agents).
3. See Seeley, Wowicke, Meselson, Guillemin & Akratanakul, Yellow Rain, 253
Sci. AM. 128 (1985) (claiming chemical analysis of "yellow rain" revealed it indistin-
guishable from bee feces).
4. See infra note 22 and accompanying text (tying this notion to an interpretation of
these restraints as merely prohibiting first use); see also STOCKHOLi INT'L PEACE RE-
SEARCH INST., THE LAW OF WAR AND DUBIOUS WEAPONS 4 (1976) (noting that the
legal principle of tu quoque was rejected as a defense when asserted by war criminals
tried following World War II).
5. See Kucewicz, Soviets Search for Eerie New Weapons, Wall St. J., Apr. 23.
1984, at 30, col. 3 (first in a series entitled Beyond Yellow Rain: The Threat of Soviet
Genetic Engineering, based on a seven-month investigation by the Wall Street Journal).
6. See Unauthorized Storage of Toxic Agents: Hearings Before the Senate Commit-
tee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) [hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings].
7. McDougal & Feliciano, International Coercion and World Public Order: The
General Principles of the Law of War, 67 YALE L.J. 771 (1985).
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ment of any kind of wartime restraint. The prospects for effective inter-
national law are less a matter of devising and tinkering with existing
texts of rules and agreements than of stimulating compliance at the
domestic level. Cultural norms of aversion to behavior and tactics that
spread disease in armed conflict need to be invoked and mobilized to
reinforce the legal inhibitions. Citizens, regardless of their state's ideo-
logical orientation, must realize that implementing normative restraints
depends heavily upon their direct action, both to stimulate bureaucratic
compliance and to invigorate representative institutions.' This poses a
special challenge in those countries, such as the Soviet Union, where no
effective channels for citizen participation of a democratic character
exist.
I. THE EXISTING INTERNATIONAL LEGAL REGIME
Currently, two international agreements provide the existing frame-
work for transnational regulation of biological warfare: the 1925 Ge-
neva Protocol ("Protocol"), 9 and the 1972 Biological Weapons Conven-
tion.10 The Protocol continues earlier international law efforts to ban
the use of poison gas as a weapon.1 Biological warfare, however, was
only incidental to the principle treaty objectives, and is not even men-
tioned in the Preamble to the Protocol, which declares:
[w]hereas the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and of all
analogous liquids, materials or devices, has been justly condemned by the general
opinion of the civilized world . . . ftlo the end that this prohibition shall be
universally accepted as a part of International Law, binding alike the conscience
and the practice of nations. 12
8. See Falk, Nuclear Weapons and the End of Democracy, 2 PRAXIS INT'L 52
(1982); Falk, Nuclear Weapons and the Renewal of Democracy, 4 PRAXIS INT'L 115
(1984) (providing an analysis in a parallel setting).
9. Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphixiating, Poisonous or
Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, June 17, 1925, 26 U.S.T.
571, T.I.A.S. No. 8061, 94 L.N.T.S. 65 [hereinafter cited as Protocol]; see U.S. DEP'T
OF STATE, TREATIES IN FORCE 242 (1985) (listing 129 state signatories).
10. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, and Stockpiling
of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxic Weapons and on Their Destruction, Apr. 10,
1972, 26 U.S.T. 583, T.I.A.S. No. 8062 [hereinafter cited as Convention]; see U.S.
DEP'T OF STATE, TREATIES IN FORCE 218 (1985) (listing 110 signatories to the
Convention).
11. See THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS 69 (D. Schindler & J. Toman cds. 1973)
(explaining how attempts to formally ban the use of poisons during warfare date back
to the First Hague International Peace Conference convened in 1899); A.W. THOMAS
& A.J. THOMAS, JR., DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL LIMITATIONS ON THE
USE OF CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS 44-71 (1970) (containing a comprehen-
sive discussion of pre-Protocol international law) [hereinafter cited as THOMAS &
THOMAS].
12. Protocol, supra note 9, at Preamble.
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The operative clause of the Protocol, in effect, restates a preexisting
prohibition on poison gas that clearly pertained to chemical weaponry.
The perception of bacteriological warfare, however, was quite different.
No definite prior legal tradition of prohibition existed with respect to
biological substances. The treaty rule itself established the prohibition.
Recognizing the limitations of previous treaty language, the Protocol
declares that "the High Contracting Parties . . . extend this prohibi-
tion [on poison gas] to the use of bacteriological methods of warfare."'13
There are several problems with the Protocol, despite wide adherence
and the general view that it embodies a customary rule of international
law, at least with respect to chemical weapons. 1' The first is the lack of
consensus concerning the identity of the toxic agents included within
the prohibition. The use of herbicides and non-lethal tear gas by the
United States during the Indochina War exemplifies this. 8 When the
United States voted in favor of the 1966 General Assembly Resolution
calling for strict observance of the Protocol, it made a statement that it
did not view the use of riot-control agents and herbicides as prohib-
ited. 6 Yet, as one commentator observed, this practice was "danger-
ous, not because tear gases or herbicides in themselves present any ab-
normal threat to international security," but because no unambiguous
distinction can be drawn between these agents and the other "poisonous
* . . materials specified in the Protocol: their legitimation therefore
risks impugning the entire body of law that stems from the Protocol. 1
To clarify the scope of the Protocol, in 1969 the General Assembly
approved Resolution 2603A, which asserts an extensive view of the
Protocol to include these non-lethal chemicals.18 Specifically, the Reso-
13. Id. at Declaration, para. 1.
14. See G.A. Res. 2603A, 30 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 34) at 16, U.N. Doc. A/
7630 (1969) (recognizing that the Geneva Protocol "embodies the generally recognized
rules of international law prohibiting the use in international armed conflicts of all
biological and chemical methods of warfare, regardless of any technical developments
S... "); see also J. SPAiGHT, AIR POWER AND VAR RioH'rs 138 (1947) (noting Ge-
neva Protocol position on biological warfare).
15. See 10 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 470-73 (1968) (con-
taining July 31, 1964 statement of Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara that the
South Vietnamese military and police were equipped with riot-control agents and Au-
gust 1, 1964 statement of Secretary of State Dean Rusk discussing use of poison gas by
the United States in Vietnam).
16. G.A. Res. 2162B, 16 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 17) at 11, U.N. Doc. A/6136
(1966).
17. Robinson, The Changing Status of Chemical and Biological Warfare: Recent
Technical. Military and Political Developments, in 2 STOCKHOLM INT'L PEACE RE-
SEARCH INST. Y.B. 317, 321 (1982).
18. G.A. Res. 2603A, 30 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 34) at 16, U.N. Doc. A/7630
(1969).
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lution interprets the Protocol as prohibiting the use in international
armed conflict of any chemical agents of warfare, whether gaseous, liq-
uid, or solid, employed for their direct toxic effect on persons, animals,
or plants and of all biological agents of warfare. The Protocol is also
ambiguous about the scope of the proscription against biological
agents. While toxins derived from living things, such as cobra venom,
may be considered biological agents, General Assembly Resolution
2603A defines "biological agents" as live organisms capable of multi-
plying,19 thus excluding such toxins. The use of these agents would still
be prohibited under the Protocol, because these fall within the defini-
tion of chemical agents, but it has been argued that the 1972 Conven-
tion regulating the development and stockpiling of biological weapons 20
does not apply to these substances.
Although passed by wide margin, the Resolution is only a recom-
mendation and is not as such officially binding. It is further weakened
by the number of abstentions and absentees, which included most of
the close allies of the United States. 21 The relevant point here is that a
sovereign state can make its own self-serving interpretation of its obli-
gations under international law, particularly during a time of war.
Under the current regime, little can be done to change a state's unilat-
eral interpretation; neither the political will nor an effective enforce-
ment vehicle exists to curb abuse. For example, parties subsequent to
the United States involvement in Vietnam used herbicides in Portu-
guese Africa and again in the Horn of Africa without arousing suffi-
cient criticism to enforce international controls under either the Proto-
col or General Assembly Resolution 2603A.
A second problem with the Protocol is that the United States and
some other parties have interpreted it as merely prohibiting the first
use of the prohibited weaponry. Some parties have either made a reser-
vation to this effect or their practice has emphasized the development
of stockpiles available for retaliatory use.2 2 In fact, the overall non-use
of poison gas by combatants during World War II has been generally
19. See G.A. Res. 2603A, 30 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 34) at 16, U.N. Doc. A/
7630 (1969) (defining biological agents of warfare as "living organisms, whatever their
nature, or infective material derived from them - which are intended to cause disease
of death in man, animals or plants, and which depend for their effects on their ability
to multiply in the person, animal or plant attacked.").
20. Convention, supra note 10.
21. See 24 U.N. GAOR (1836th mtg.) at 4, U.N. Doc. A/PV/1836 (1969) (record-
ing vote on General Assembly Resolution 2603A as 80 in favor, 36 abstentions, 7 ab-
sent, and 3, including the United States, against).
22. See 2 STOCKHOLM INT'L PEACE RESEARCH INST. Y.B. 318 (1982) (listing par-
ties that expressly reserve the right to retaliate in kind).
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perceived as reflecting this deterrent structure, that is, fear of retalia-
tion as well as the recognition by military commanders that no decisive
advantages could be achieved. 23 Thus, it appears that where victim
states lack the capacity to retaliate in kind, warring nations are more
likely to resort to poison gas or other prohibited weaponry. Illustrative
examples include Italy's use of poison gas against Ethiopia (1935-
1936),24 Japan's use of poison gas against China (1937-1945),2 5 and
Iraq's use of poison gas against Iran (1982-1983).
20
A further weakness of the Protocol is that it prohibits only the use of
the proscribed substances. The Protocol does not clearly forbid threats
to use, and it makes no effort to prohibit research, development, and
possession. It would be naive to believe that once stockpiles for retalia-
tion exist, strategists would not consider their use for other purposes,
especially under wartime conditions. As a consequence, the prohibitions
of the treaty remain a factor in policy-making, but they must increas-
ingly compete with considerations of military necessity. Some of these
weaknesses were eliminated with the signature and ratification of the
1972 Biological Weapons Convention ("Convention") 21 which entered
into force in 1975. The Preamble to the Convention places the prohibi-
tion in the wider context of "achieving effective progress toward gen-
eral and complete disarmament, including the prohibition and elimina-
tion of all types of weapons of mass destruction." 28 The Preamble also
explicitly reaffirms the Geneva Protocol prohibition and augments its
prohibitions on use, a feature reiterated in Article VIII. The Preamble
also asserts that a legal regime prohibiting development, production,
and stockpiling of biological weapons is "a first possible step" toward
the establishment of a comparable regime for chemical weapons. The
linking of biological warfare and chemical warfare regimes is impor-
tant because it acts to discourage acquisition of a deterrent capability,
which would likely stimulate an arms race, as well as to achieve an
23. See, J. SPAIGHT, AIR POWER AND VAR Rioirrs 188 (1947) (reporting that
Winston Churchill advocated large-scale gas attack on Germany during World War 11
and was dissuaded by tactical reasoning and retaliatory prospects, rather than by legal
inhibitions).
24. See THOMAS & THOMAS, supra note 11, at 162-63 (discussing the use of poison
gas during time of war).
25. Id. at 164-66. See also Kelly, Gas Warfare in International Law, 9 MIL L.
REV. 1, 13 (1960); 0' Brien, Biological Chemical Warfare and the International Law
of War, 51 GEO. L.J. 1, 33-34 (1962).
26. Iraq Escalates to Nerve Gas, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 9, 1984, at 71; see also N.Y.
Times, Feb. 23, 1986, at 11, col. I (charging Iran with use of mustard gas against
Iraq).
27. Convention, supra note 10.
28. Id. at preamble (emphasis added).
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unconditional and comprehensive regime of prohibition on these types
of weapons. Finally, the Preamble asserts as the goal of the Convention
the complete exclusion of the possibility of bacteriological (biological)
agents and toxins being used as weapons and insists that "such use
would be repugnant to the conscience of mankind. '29 Here, particu-
larly, the Convention invokes societal attitudes as a ground for the ef-
forts of statesmen to achieve an effective legal regime. The Convention
considers that the effectiveness of that regime involves prohibition of
development and possession, as well as the threat of use and actual use.
This extension of the prohibitions of the Protocol to stages prior to use
is a practical recognition that inhibiting use in armed conflict requires
a stable regime of non-possession. If states lack biological weapons ca-
pability, there is no need to induce respect for the norm prohibiting
use; if they do have such capability, the prospect of inducing respect is
fragile, at best, especially if considerations of military necessity appear
to warrant use.
Article I of the Convention formulates the basic treaty obligation.
Parties agree "never in any circumstances to develop, produce, stock-
pile or otherwise acquire or retain . . .(1) Microbial or other biologi-
cal agents, or toxins whatever their origin or method of production, of
types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, pro-
tective or other peaceful purposes."30 The prohibition in this article is
far-reaching, yet it is of limited value due to the uncertainty created by
the vagueness of its qualifying language.
Under Article II of the Convention, the parties pledge to "undertake
to destroy, or to divert to peaceful purposes" all biological agents, in-
cluding delivery equipment.3 1 Articles I and II should encompass the
retention and use of biological agents by intelligence agencies or any
entity directly or indirectly related to the government.3 2 Assuming that
such covert organs of the modern state acknowledge canons of account-
ability at all, such activities again may be sheltered within the qualify-
ing language.
Article IV imposes upon parties the important obligation to assure
that "necessary measures" are taken to prevent any "development, pro-
duction, stockpiling, acquisition or retention of the agents, toxins,
29. Id.
30. Id. at art. I (emphasis added).
31. Id. at art. II.
32. Convention, supra note 10, at art. 1(2) (stating "each State Party . . .under-
takes never in any circumstances to . . .acquire or retain . . . such agents or toxins
for hostile purposes or in armed conflict").
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weapons, equipment and means of delivery" within its territory.- This
obligation requires domestic legislation and regulation within constitu-
tional limits of activities of individuals, universities, and corporate
groups. As yet, only a few parties to the Convention have seen fit to
enact appropriate implementing legislation.4
Articles V and VI of the Convention contain verification and en-
forcement mechanisms that are notably absent from the Protocol.
Under these provisions, the parties undertake to "consult" and "cooper-
ate" in solving problems arising under the Convention 5 and may file a
complaint with the U.N. Security Council when another party is con-
sidered to be "acting in breach of obligations" under the Convention. 0
Article VI(2) further obliges the parties to "cooperate" in carrying out
a U.N. Security Council investigation.3 7
Article X involves the agreement of the parties to share fully the
peaceful uses arising from "further development and application of sci-
entific discoveries in the field of bacteriology (biology)."- Article
XIII(1) states that the Convention "shall be of unlimited duration,"
301
but Article XIII(2) reserves a right of withdrawal from the treaty obli-
gations if a party "decides that extraordinary events related to the sub-
ject matter of the Convention have jeopardized the supreme interests of
the country."40
II. THE CURRENT STATUS OF THE LEGAL REGIME
The signal achievement of this Convention should not be overlooked,
nor should its contents be too easily deprecated. Both superpowers have
legally committed themselves to forego possession as well as use. As a
result, no retaliatory use, or even deterrent capability, is contemplated
or permissible under the Convention and renunciation is unconditional.
Furthermore, parties agreed to destroy stockpiles of biological weapons
existing as of 1975 within nine months of the Convention's entry into
force.41 Significantly, the parties to the Convention signed simultane-
33. Convention, supra note 10, at art. V.
34. In the United States, Congressman Peter Rodino (D-N.J.) introduced H.R. 7977
on August 20, 1980 to implement the Convention in the United States. The bill is still
pending.
35. See Convention, supra note 10, at art. V.
36. Id. at art. VI(1).
37. Id. at art. VI(2).
38. Id. at art. X.
39. Id. at art. XIII(1).
40. Id. at art. XIII(2).
41. See Convention, supra note 10, at art. II.
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ously in Washington, London, and Moscow. 42 It enjoys the participa-
tion of the Soviet Union, the United States, the United Kingdom, and
most other major states (with the exception of China and France).43 In
this respect, the illegal status of biological weapons is more widely and
significantly established than for any category of weaponry including
chemical and nuclear. On its face then, the Convention seems to pro-
vide a comprehensive repudiation of development, production, and
stockpiling of biological weaponry that does not depend upon deter-
rence for enforcement. What the Convention does permit is research
associated with "defensive" or peaceful purposes.
Despite its numerous achievements, many recognize that the Con-
vention, like the Protocol, suffers from many flaws and ambiguities.
Particularly, critics assert that given the developments in biological ca-
pabilities and in the attitudes of states toward such weaponry, the Con-
vention lacks sufficient restraints. First, "peaceful" applications can no
longer be reliably distinguished from "military" applications. Similarly,
"defensive" research, to protect populations by immunization and other
methods, is also relevant for work toward a biological first-strike capa-
bility. Consequently, the Article I limitation to biological agents or tox-
ins "that have no justification for prophylactic, protective or other
peaceful purposes"4 4 is a gigantic loophole capable of being reconciled
with almost any desired path of research. Similarly, the Article II obli-
gation to destroy stockpiles exempts any biological agent or toxin that
is diverted to peaceful purposes. 5 This again allows states an alarming
degree of discretion, which, when taken with ineffective verification
procedures, means compliance almost entirely depends upon good faith
and self-interest.
The veil of secrecy covering activities in this area arouses suspicions
and makes it difficult to distinguish innocent from sinister activity on
the part of foreign states and within our own. Malicious propaganda
cannot easily be distinguished from disturbing revelation. Suspicions
about violative behavior are, as a practical matter, impossible to verify
by the procedures set forth in the Convention. 6 Parties are not cooper-
42. See STOCKHOLM INT'L PEACE RESEARCH INST., THE LAW OF WAR AND DUBI-
OUS WEAPONS 61 (1976).
43. See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, TREATIES IN FORCE 218 (1985) (listing signatories to
the Convention).
44. Convention, supra note 10, at art. I.
45. Id. at art. II.
46. See Convention, supra, note 10, at art. VI (providing that any state party who
has evidence violations have occurred may register complaint with the U.N. Security
Council which has discretion, subject to the restraints of Article 1I, paragraph 7 of the
U.N. Charter, to investigate).
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ative, tending to dismiss even reasonable suspicions as propaganda.
Given levels of international distrust, especially between the two su-
perpowers, the potential dynamic of a biological weapons arms race
seems present, despite adherence by both superpowers to a legal regime
that forbids "development." There is nothing yet available to suggest
any official disposition on the part of the U.S. Government to back
away from President Richard Nixon's 1969 unconditional repudiation
of biological warfare,47 which included an unprecedented unilateral un-
dertaking to destroy then-existing stockpiles of biological weaponry.4 8
Noticeably, however, the U.S. Government has recently stepped up its
support for experimentation and "development" of biological agents
based upon medical justifications, but such research easily could have
military implications. 49 The United States partly justifies its increased
research by a claim that the Soviet Union is investing heavily in re-
search and development to achieve a biological weapons arsenal or,
more alarmingly, to circumvent the nuclear stalemate by developing a
biological first-strike capability. 0
The use of biological weapons is gaining greater consideration by
military planners because nuclear weapons are generally considered too
destructive to permit strategic victory.51 Although the idea of using bio-
logical agents for specific purposes has been present since ancient
times,52 military strategists have not given such weaponry high regard
47. President's Statement to the Press Renouncing Biological Warfare, 5 WEEKLY
COMP. PRES. Doc. 1659 (Dec. 1, 1969) [hereinafter cited as Nixon Memorandum].
48. U.S. Policy on Toxins, 7 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 1794 (Feb. 16, 1970);
Senate Hearings, supra note 6, at 10.
49. See Wright & Sinheimer, Recombinant DNA and Biological Warfare, BuLL. OF
ATOM. ScIENTIsTs, Nov. 1983, at 21 (noting an increase in defense obligations for all
biological research increased in real terms by fifteen percent in fiscal years 1981 and
1982 respectively).
50. Kucewicz, Soviets Search for Eerie New Weapons, Wall St. J., Apr. 23, 1984,
at 30, col. 4. In 1979, U.S. suspicions were dramatically aroused by an explosion at a
Soviet biological weapons facility in Sverdlovsk in which approximately 1,000 soldiers
and civilians were killed from the release of anthrax spores into the atmosphere. Id.
The Soviets have not persuasively explained the incident. Id. The contention, which
arises from these alleged activities, is that a society could immunize its own population
and then let loose a biological agent that would spread a disabling or lethal disease
throughout an enemy society. Id. at 30, col. 6. Kucewicz contends that evidence sup-
ports allegations that the Soviet Union is embarked on a search for biological weapons
agents for which no credible defense is possible; See id. (stating "[lit now appears such
weapons are being developed in earnest by the Soviet Union, and that threat may
someday rival even nuclear war").
51. R. ALDRIDGE, FiRsT STRIKE: THE PENTAGON'S STRATEGY FOR NUCLEAR VAR
(1983).
52. See THOMAS & THOMAS, supra note 11, at 155-56 (noting that crude methods of
biological warfare were used in ancient times when "bodies of cholera and plague vic-
tims were dropped over the walls of beleaguered cities and left on the ground the en-
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because they thought it too difficult to control, too unpredictable and
too diffuse in effect.8 3 Recent technological developments, however,
may ultimately result in an insidious unraveling of the widespread cul-
tural support for banishing biological weapons and in their use outside
the limited, if abhorrent, setting of "coVert operations."
III. COVERT OPERATIONS AND LEGAL RESTRAINTS
Fairly serious charges exist that claim the CIA's destabilization ef-
forts against Castro's Cuba included projects to infect poultry and to
induce pig fever by way of an African swine virus, previously unknown
in this hemisphere. 54 The alleged use of biological agents is constitu-
tionally significant as it was subsequent to Nixon's repudiation of such
weaponry in 1969. 55 It also suggests that nations cannot take for
granted the strict adherence to the law, despite dramatic public ges-
tures of adherence by a government and its leaders.
The Senate Committee Hearings in 1975 investigated whether such
covert operations constituted military activities or "bacteriological
methods of warfare" encompassed by the Nixon Memorandum."0 The
hearings inquired into the CIA's retention of toxins 57 long after Presi-
dent Nixon had issued an order for their destruction.58 Senator Walter
Mondale questioned a CIA official, Nathan Gordon, about the failure
of the agency to carry out the order:
Senator Mondale: So what the CIA was involved in was not military?
Mr. Gordon: The CIA is not a military organization. It is not, nor has never
[sic] been charged with the functions of Department of Defense. Yes; it is not a
military organization."9
emy was to occupy").
53. In the 1930's Japan engaged in biological weapons research, and during World
War II may have employed such weapons. See M. GREENSPAN, THE MODERN LAW OF
LAND WARFARE 358, n.148 (1959) (discussing the trial and conviction of twelve Japa-
nese officers before a Soviet military tribunal in 1949 for the use of anthrax, plague,
cholera, and typhus biological agents against the Mongolian People's Republic in 1939
and against China in 1940-42).
54. See N. CHOMSKY & E.S. HERMAN, THE WASHINGTON CONNECTION AND THIRD
WORLD FAsCIsM 69, 379 n.94 (1979).
55. Nixon Memorandum, supra note 47.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 16 (revealing that the CIA had stored 8 milligrams of cobra venom and
had also retained 11 grams of shellfish toxin said to be capable of killing 14,000
people).
58. U.S. Policy on Toxins, 7 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1794 (Feb. 16, 1970);
Senate Hearings, supra note 6, at 10.
59. See Senate Hearings, supra note 6, at 71 (providing Senator Mondale questions




This demonstrates the existence of ample room for evading national
and international obligations, either by regarding only military organi-
zations as obliged to abide by such commitments, by transferring mili-
tary activity to non-military or para-military entities within the govern-
ment,60 or by characterizing substances as falling outside the
prohibition. 1
The hearings also evidenced revealing exchanges from William
Colby, then Director of the CIA, who detailed a fairly comprehensive
role for the CIA in relation to biological weapons. He referred to four
"functional categories" of CIA activity:
a. maintenance of a stockpile of temporarily incapacitating and lethal agents in
readiness for operational use;
b. assessment and maintenance of biological and chemical disseminating systems
for operational use;
c. adaptation and testing of a non-discernible microbio-inoculator (a dart device
for clandestine and imperceptible inoculation with toxic agents) for use with va-
rious materials and to assure that the microbio-inoculator could not be easily
detected by later examination of the target; and
d. providing technical support and consultation on request for offensive and de-
fensive [biological/chemical warfare]. 01
Significantly, throughout the hearings, top CIA officials failed to ac-
knowledge any legal (or normative) inhibition on the use of biological
agents, even for offensive purposes. Colby referred to the reliance of the
Office of Strategic Services (OSS), the predecessor to the CIA, on bio-
logical materials to incapacitate a Nazi leader during World War II as
establishing "[t]he need for such capabilities." 3 Of the toxic sub-
stances in the CIA's possession in violation of Nixon's destruction or-
der, Colby stated forthrightly: "There is no question about it. It was
also for offensive reasons. No question about it.""
The same attitude applied to other biological agents that the CIA
held at Fort Detrick. Regarding materials designed to induce tubercu-
losis, the exchange at the Hearings was as follows:
Senator Huddleston: What application would be made of the particular agent?
Mr. Colby: It is obviously to induce tuberculosis in a subject that you want to
60. See Senate Hearings, supra note 6, at 37-38, 59-64 (containing admissions that
6 of the CIA's 11 grams of shellfish toxin came from the Dep't of Defense's supply
which should have been destroyed and that the CIA considered transferring its shellfish
toxin to a private firm for storage).
61. See Senate Hearings, supra note 5, at 64-73 (characterizing shellfish toxin as a
chemical agent possibly exempt from Nixon's ban on biological toxins).
62. Id. at 11.
63. Id. at 10.
64. Id. at 17. Colby apparently refers to a dartgun used for dispensing toxins as well
as to the toxins themselves.
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induce it in.
Senator Huddleston: For what purpose?
Mr. Colby: We know of no application ever being done with it. but the idea of
giving someone this particular disease is obviously the thought process behind
this.65
As the Chairman of the Select Committee, Frank Church, expressed
his concern:
The particular case under examination today involves the illegal possession of
deadly biological poisons which were retained within the CIA for 5 years after
their destruction was ordered by the President and for 5 years [sic] after the
United States had entered into a solemn international commitment not to main-
tain stocks of these poisons except for very limited research purposes."
There are several salient features of these CIA hearings that are
worthy of note. First of all, the relative openness of American society,
especially for a short period in the post-Vietnam setting of congres-
sional opposition to the Executive branch, enabled such an inquiry into
this otherwise secret, sensitive subject matter and exposed broader
structural problems. There is every reason to suppose that the patterns,
practices, and attitudes of the CIA are to some extent present in the
intelligence services of all major states - basically, non-accountability
and a cynical disregard of normative inhibitions. Second, Congress was
more concerned with compliance with domestic law, obeying the Nixon
Memorandum, 67 than with international law. Third, the language of
the CIA officials shows almost no sensitivity whatsoever to the exis-
tence or importance of international legal constraints. What seemed
important to CIA officials was obedience to "superior orders" within
the U.S. Government and maximum policy flexibility for the CIA in
relation to any future mission. These overall attitudes infused the con-
gressional orientation toward the inquiry. The Senate Select Commit-
tee made no serious effort during extensive questioning to assess the
manifested indifference of CIA officials to international legal obliga-
tions to which the United States had given its assent.68The Senate
Committee's attitude, however, distinctly contrasts with allegations of
non-compliance directed at rival states, particularly the Soviet Union."9
65. Id. at 27.
66. Id. at 2 (opening statement of Senator Church, Chairman of the Select Commit-
tee); see id. at 21 (noting similar sentiments expressed by Senator Mondale).
67. Nixon Memorandum, supra note 47.
68. See G.A. Res. 2162B, 16 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 17) at 11, U.N. Doc. A/6316
(1966) (calling for strict observance of Protocol by all States). But see Neinast, United
States Use of Biological Warfare, 24 MIL. L. REv. 1 (1964) (arguing that the United
States was not bound under international legal obligations prior to hearings).
69. Address by Alexander M. Haig, U.S. Secretary of State to Berlin Press Associa-
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In other words, evidence suggests a disturbing failure by subdivisions
of government to abide by a national policy respectful of international
commitments. These concerns raise fundamental issues of state-civil so-
cietal relations, and indicate the difficulty involved in making the law
effective in the internal functioning of the modern state in the national
security context.
What do we expect from government? How should "checks and bal-
ances" function in relation to compliance and accountability in the na-
tional security area? In the background, also, is the "we/they" prob-
lem. If we believe that they are not complying, why should we? Or
more assertively, their non-compliance makes it prudent, and maybe
even necessary and desirable, to take protective and deterrent steps to
restore balance and discourage use. The only way to reinforce the inhi-
bition on use may be, under certain circumstances, to violate the rele-
vant agreement.
IV. STRENGTHENING THE SETTING OF THE LEGAL
REGIME
The discussion of the prior sections suggests that the biological weap-
ons regime is under severe pressure from a number of developments.
The problems are not surprising, but their correction is exceedingly dif-
ficult to achieve within the treaty framework through recourse to the
amendment process.70 The one possible exception would be to reformu-
late, by treaty amendment, the Article I qualification in a more restric-
tive manner. For instance, the wording "that have no justification"
could be replaced by "unless they have an overwhelming and unambig-
uous justification."7 1 In a multilateral setting, however, amendments
tion 5 (September 13, 1981) (accusing the Soviet Union and its allies with using three
biological agents, mycotoxins, in Southeast Asia, available as U.S. Dep't of State, Press
Release No. 300 (Sept. 12, 1981); see also Stoessel, US. Issues Report on Chemical
Warfare, 82 DEP'T OF STATE BULL- 57 (May 1982) (linking the U.S.S.R. and its sur-
rogates with the use of chemical and toxin weapons in Afghanistan, Kampuchea, and
Laos).
70. See Convention, supra note 10, at art. XI (noting that "[any State Party may
propose amendments to this convention. Amendments shall enter into force for each
State Party accepting the amendments upon their acceptance by a majority of the
States Parties to the convention and thereafter for each remaining State Party on the
date of acceptance by it.").
71. See Convention, supra note 10, at art. I (stating "[E]ach State Party to this
Convention undertakes never in any circumstances to develop, produce, stockpile, or
otherwise acquire or retain: (1) Microbiological or other biological agents, or toxins
whatever their origin or method of production, of types and in quantities that have no
justification for the prophylactic, protective, or other peaceful purposes ... ") (em-
phasis added).
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that all of the principal parties do not formally accept fragment the
treaty regime and bind the various parties to different degrees in rela-
tion to each of the other parties.
More substantively, states are unlikely to forego the exemption for
"peaceful applications" currently allowed by the Convention to in-
crease reassurances that military development activities are not taking
place. Similarly, principal states are not currently disposed to accept
even impartial, external monitoring procedures over national research
activities. To provide reassurance, monitoring would have to be both
intrusive and extensive, and, even then, might not quiet suspicions and
allegations. Finally, especially in the present international atmosphere,
states are not only reluctant to augment investigative, verification, and
compliance machinery,7 2 but, the existing procedures of recourse to the
Security Council are unlikely to prove useful since the Security Council
cannot operate if a Permanent Member exercises its veto power. Any
extension of the prohibition on research and development is likewise not
negotiable, given the attitudes of governments toward international se-
curity arrangements. Efforts to insist on such strengthening could
weaken treaty morale even further.
The weaknesses of the legal regime are not fortuitous. They reflect
the state-centered character of international relations. They also reflect
the subject matter, which makes it rather easy for a determined viola-
tor to evade even a rigorous apparatus for verification. In this regard,
the Convention may be unverifiable in any serious sense, regardless of
the will of the parties on the issue. Therefore, the rationalist view of
closing the loopholes and limitations of the existing arrangement so as
to move toward greater effectiveness is naive unless reinforced by a new
set of political tendencies in a more supportive global setting. It is pos-
sible that a more positive phase of U.S.-U.S.S.R. relations could be
expressed by a more cooperative approach to arms arrangements. 73
A protective posture toward the Convention may be useful at this
stage. Reassurances about compliance by both superpowers would re-
duce the pressure to engage in research with ambiguous ramifications.
One of the frailties of the Convention is the inevitable connection be-
tween "defensive research" and "offensive capability"; it is difficult to
conduct the former without achieving the latter. At the moment, both
liberals and conservatives in the United States are challenging confi-
72. See, e.g., Oberdorfer & Pincus, Arms Compliance Ideas Drafted, Wash. Post,
Jan. 9, 1986, at A7, col. 1 (noting verification of compliance has long been a conten-
tious arms control issue).
73. See Wash. Post, Dec. 24, 1985, at Al, col. 6 (reporting apparent Soviet interest
in on-site inspection for nuclear arms control verification purposes).
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dence in treaty compliance. Liberals complain that the Department of
Defense is concealing research with offensive applications by claiming
peaceful intentions.
74
Conservatives give credence to contentions by Soviet emigre scien-
tists that the Kremlin is embarked upon an enormous program of secret
research and development activity to assemble the basis for a world-
conquering biological warfare scenario. 5 Pressure may continue to
mount on the United States to withdraw from its legal commitments if
suspicions about Soviet "development" activities are confirmed or ac-
cepted at face value.76 Of course, such allegations, whether true or be-
lieved to be true, may serve to mask developmental pressures in this
country. Whether the allegations constitute "cause" or "pretext" is
very difficult to determine.7 Arkady N. Shevchenko, a high-ranking
Soviet diplomat who defected to the West in 1978, provided damaging
testimony about Soviet behavior. He describes the Soviet attitude to-
ward international regulation as follows:
While the military strongly opposed any agreement on chemical or biological
weapons, the political leadership, Gromyko in particular, felt it necessary for
propoganda purposes to respond to a proposal by Great Britain to conclude a
separate convention to prohibit biological warfare as a first step. The military's
reaction was to say go ahead and sign the convention; without international con-
trots, who would know anyway? They refused to consider eliminating their stock-
piles and insisted upon further development of these weapons. The Politburo ap-
proved this approach. The toothless convention regarding biological weapons was
signed in 1972, but there are no international controls over the Soviet program,
which continues apace.
78
It is difficult to evaluate these various allegations, but an interna-
tional intergovernmental effort to provide reassurance about compli-
ance would restore confidence, as would some procedure for a common
framework of agreed research. An intergovernmental select body of ex-
perts should be established to investigate the general directions of bio-
logical research and to set guidelines to sustain the prohibition on mili-
74. Wright & Sinheimer, Recombinant DNA and Biological Warfare, BULL. OF
ATOM. SCIENTISTs, Nov. 1983, at 20, 21.
75. Kucewicz, Soviets Search for Eerie New Weapons, Wall St. J., Apr. 23, 1984,
at 30, col. 3.
76. Id.
77. How Many Smoking Guns?, Wall St. J., Nov. 3, 1981 at 34, col. 1; Anyone
Serious?, Wall St. J., Nov. 23, 1981 at 34, col. 1; Wall St. J., Jan. 4, 1982 at 31, col. I
(letter to the editor from Richard Burt, then Director of the Bureau of Politico-Mili-
tary Affairs of the U.S. Dep't of State); see also Wall St. J., Jan. 24, 1982, at 24, col.
3, at 26, col. 6 (noting suspicions of Soviet use of chemical weapons in Southeast Asia
and Afghanistan).
78. A. SHEVCHENKO, BREAKING WITH MOSCOW 174 (1985).
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tary application to withstand the growing awareness of the combat
potential of biological agents of warfare.
Publicity is also important, provided it is of a responsible kind. Re-
peating wild allegations about the behavior of a rival state tends only to
weaken the commitment to uphold the legal regime on all sides. The
recent efforts of public interest groups to insist that research with bio-
logical warfare implications be preceded by an environmental impact
statement demonstrate one useful approach.79 Such efforts help to quiet
the fear that a small specialized unit located deep in the Pentagon la-
byrinth will build up a vested interest in assimilating biological warfare
into military planning, and by secret activity, proceed far along a devel-
opmental path before the public, or even the rest of the government is
aware. At this stage a nongovernmental private watchdog committee of
eminent scientists and jurists should be established in the United States
to oversee the interaction between research activities and allegations,
and, perhaps, issue a report to dramatize concerns. Simultaneously,
perhaps, some kind of informal international committee of experts
should be established to explore the means to restore confidence in the
1972 treaty regime.80 A review conference of parties to the Convention
scheduled to take place at Geneva in October 1986 might provide the,
occasion on which to proceed in this direction."
The special advantage of the biological warfare legal regime should
be appreciated. Cultural revulsion should be tied to a framework that
prohibits possession and development, as well as use. Furthermore,
leading states possess a strong geopolitical incentive to avoid opening
any further the lid on a biological warfare Pandora's box given the
severe instabilities that could follow, including the danger of accidental
or negligent release of biological toxins, widespread proliferation, sabo-
tage, and terrorism.
79. See Foundation on Economic Trends v. Heckler, 756 F.2d 143 (D.C. Cir. 1985)
(affirming an injunction temporarily enjoining a university experiment that involved
deliberate release of genetically engineered recombinant DNA into the open environ-
ment); Foundation on Economic Trends v. Weinberger, 610 F. Supp. 829 (D.D.C.
1985) (granting a permanent injunction against construction of a laboratory by the
Dep't of Defense to test chemical warfare and biological defense systems because of
failure to issue satisfactory environmental assessment); see also National Environmen-
tal Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370 (1976 and Supp. V. 1981) (requiring environ-
mental impact statement for testing of chemical and biological defense systems).
80. See Falk, Strengthening the Biological Weapons Convention of 1972 (to be pub-
lished in a 1986 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute Volume tentatively
entitled Biological and Toxin Weapons Today) (providing suggestions along this line,
together with supportive analysis).
81. See 5 U.N. DISARMAMENT Y.B. 264 (1980) (noting the first review conference
on the Convention was held in March 1980).
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